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As more countries are relying on the private sector for provision of public services, 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are at the center of this growing trend. Optimal risk 
allocation through risk transfer to the private sector is the critical issue for the success of 
these partnerships in achieving best value-for-money (VfM) for the public sector. Using 
the Portuguese shadow toll concessions (SCUT), this study aims to analyze and evaluate 
their allocation of risk between the public and private sectors. Accordingly, the first part 
of the paper examines how risks in the SCUT concessions were allocated. Our analysis 
indicates that for the most part, with the exception of demand risk, risks were well 
allocated. The second part of the paper identifies and evaluates the main risks transferred 
to the private sector. It also goes further in assessing gains before and after risk transfer, 
if any, to the private sector. We find that risks transferred to the private sector account for 
a very small share of public sector payments. This paper also concludes that the costs to 
the public sector, through the payment obligations, far outweigh those assumed by the 
private sector. Consequently, this paper examines whether the SCUT concessions were 
successful in regards to achieving VfM. The high gains to the private sector may suggest 
otherwise. However, given that there was no comparison of VfM between the PPP 
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1. Introduction  
In recent years, the challenge of bridging infrastructure gaps while working within 
budgetary constraints have led many governments to seek out new mechanisms of 
financing public projects. One of these mechanisms involves the private sector financing 
the provision of public services through Public-Private Partnerships (or PPPs) (Grimsey 
and Lewis, 2002, 2004, 2005). In its basic form, a PPP is a long-term contract between a 
government agency and a private operator to deliver a public good or service. Although a 
PPP arrangement involves many stakeholders, in this study, we focus on two main 
groups, i.e. the public and private companies. In contrast to traditional procurement 
models where public infrastructure and services are provided almost exclusively by the 
public sector, PPPs allow the private sector to take on substantially greater risk, enabling 
the public sector to capitalize on private sector efficiency through optimal risk transfer 
(Grout, 1997; Hart et al, 1997; Bentz et al, 2002; Guasch, 2004; Corner 2006). In their 
study of competitive tendering and contracting, Domberger and Rimmer (1994) find that 
governments can save up to 20% on service expenditure by applying competitive 
tendering (qtd. in Grimsey, 2003). 
However, PPPs are not without challenges. Their complex structure coupled with 
potentially conflicting stakeholder interests, different attitudes towards risk, and different 
skills in risk management make it unsuitable for some projects (Jin and Doloi, 2008). 
These inherent characteristics expose the parties involved in the contract to high level of 
risk. As highlighted by Thompson and Perry (1992), if risks are inadequately borne by 
ces to pay for 
Conversely, should risks be inadequately borne by the private sector, 
(qtd. in Jin and Doloi, 2008, pp. 708). Thus in the absence of optimal risk allocation, 
PPPs may fail to generate value-for-
combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness for purpose) of good or service 
ng VfM is the 
primary objective in PPPs.  




1). Similarly, as shown in Exhibit 2 (see appendix), projected gross payments of current 
 of which the road sector 
makes up the highest share. Moreover, seeing as the projected gross payments of current 
PPPs for the next three years make up about 1% of gross domestic product (see appendix, 
partnerships have been raised. According to Cruz and Marques (2010, pp. 4030
annual burden of these projects in a climate of constraining public expenditure has led to 
an overall negative p . It does not come as a surprise 
especially as it concerns the road sector  that some infrastructure projects have been put 
on hold and others are being modified. The SCUT concessions are a case in point and 
merit greater analysis. 
The shadow toll concessions (SCUT)  one of the major initiatives undertaken by 
the Portuguese government to develop the national transport infrastructure  were 
originally approved and 
government, and not the users, pay for the road usage. However, this has proved 
unsustainable for the Portuguese budget and has led the government to apply tolls to 
these roads. Accordingly, this study focuses on the seven SCUT concessions and aims to 
analyze and evaluate their allocation of risks between the public and private sectors. The 
study seeks to answer the following three main questions:  
(i) how are risks allocated between the public and private sectors? Consequently, 
(ii) how to best evaluate the risks allocated or transferred to the private sector? 
And finally, 
(iii) how much risk has the private sector assumed? 
Our analyses show that with the exception of demand risk, risks under the SCUT 
concessions were well allocated between the two parties. The quantitative evaluation 
shows that the risks transferred to the private sector represent a very small share of what 
the public sector is paying, and that the costs to the public sector, through the payment 
obligations, are relatively large. Apart from Grande Porto, all the concessions register 
after-risk transfer gains (before taxes).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief theoretical 




particular focus on VfM evaluation and risk allocation strategies and identification, 
respectively. This is followed by a benchmark assessment of countries with shadow toll 
payment systems. In section 3, a comprehensive background analysis of the SCUT 
concessions is provided followed by a detailed qualitative assessment of the SCUT 
concessions in a risk matrix. Section 4 outlines the methodology and basic assumptions. 
Here, we quantitatively evaluate key risks in each of the concessions through a sensitivity 
analysis in net-present-value (NPV) terms. A second method, NPV-at-risk, using Monte 
Carlo simulation is also undertaken. The results are presented and discussed in section 5. 
Section 6 outlines the limitations of the study and the conclusions reached. 
 
2. Literature Review 
While there is no single definition of a PPP, a commonly referenced interpretation 
is that a PPP is a long-term contract between a public body and a private operator in 
which arrangements concerning the design, construction, operation, and financing of a 
public project are made with the aim of enhancing the value of public assets (Guasch, 
2004; Grimsey, 2005; OECD, 2008). As advanced by Grimsey (2005), from the 
viewpoint of the public sector, VfM is the driving principle for procuring PPPs.  
 
2.1. Value-for-Money  
The decision to undertake a PPP is based on the principle that they provide greater 
value-for-money (VfM) through risk transfer. VfM can be defined as representing an 
optimal combination of cost effectiveness and quality. Six drivers underpin VfM. These 
are: risk transfer; the long-term nature of contracts (including whole-of-life cycle 
costing); the use of an output specification; competition; performance measurement and 
incentives; and private sector management skills (Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE, 
2000; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Of the drivers outlined above, the literature identifies 
risk transfer to be the most important (Hayford, 2006; Jin and Doloi, 2008; among 
others). However, as Hayford (2006) rightly asserts, risk transfer to the private sector will 
only create VfM if the costs assumed by the public sector through the risk transfer are 
less than the costs it would incur if it were to manage the risk itself. Accordingly, prior to 




procurement options determines best VfM. This requires an ex ante comparison of VfM 
of both the PPP and traditional procurement (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; OECD, 2008).  
VfM assessment should be based on qualitative and quantitative factors. A 
qualitative analysis normally encompasses setting objectives based on the scope of the 
project, regulatory issues, and market assessment (level of competition), as well as 
desired project outcomes. As will be shown in the coming sections, risk identification is 
one of the first steps taken towards risk management and its role in facilitating proper risk 
allocation is unquestionable. A risk matrix is therefore one of the commonly used tools to 
qualitatively assess VfM. 
The Public Sector Comparator (PSC), on the other hand, is the main quantitative 
test for VfM. Although various alternative tests exist, the PSC is argued to be less 
complex and more flexible than most other options (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Its 
assessment is based on cashflow terms discounted at the public sector rate and then 
after the 
reference PPP has demonstrated better value than the public provision strategy can the 
project proceed to the bidding phase (OECD, 2008). PSC estimates the hypothetical risk-
adjusted cost if a project were to be financed, owned and implemented by the 
government. It also provides a consistent benchmark and evaluation tool, and it 
encourages competition by generating confidence in the market. The latter point is worth 
noting as competition before and after the bidding process, is fundamental to the success 
of the project. In the event of post-contract renegotiation, for instance, the monopolist 
(the winning bidder) holds the advantage in comparison to a competitive entity when 
dictating negotiation terms. Also, the monopolist is more likely to be prone to 
established, competition in the bidding process is relied upon to ensure VFM Grimsey 










2.2. Risk Allocation Strategies 
The main premise underlying PPPs is that risk should be allocated to the party 
best able to manage it (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Corner 2006). Irwin (2006)1 proposes a 
more detailed framework which considers the ability of each party to (i) influence the 
corresponding risk factor; (ii) influence the sensitivity of total project value to the 
corresponding risk factor; and (iii) absorb the risk  However, the question of how risks 
particular risk transferred to the private consortium in one project, while retained by the 
government or shar 2008, pp.708). Zou et al (2008) find 
that to guarantee the success of PPP infrastructure projects, proper risk identification and 
allocation should be conducted from a life-cycle perspective. That is, it should be 
conducted from the feasibility study stage to operation and transfer stages with 
continuous monitoring, all the while ensuring VfM and taking into account public and 
private interest considerations.  
Relevant literature increasingly articulates the paramount role of PPP 
arrangements in closing infrastructure gaps created through government inefficacies in 
the conventional provision of infrastructure (Jin and Doloi, 2008), making a case for 
PPPs and their efficiency of service delivery in comparison to traditional public 
procurement (Grimsey, 2003; Corner, 2006). Brealey et al (1997) for instance, argue that 
due to its higher agency costs, the public sector is likely to be less productively efficient 
than the private sector. Early empirical evidence has shown, however, that most of the 
risk is usually borne by the public sector. According to Arrow and Lind (1970), the 
government generally holds the advantage of a more efficient distribution of risks 
because it is able to spread risk among taxpayers. However, a counterargument is that the 
cause of 
contingent liability, i.e., the taxpayer will always pay the bill (Grimsey, 2003). 
Nevertheless, Thomas et al (2003) show that 
inevitably be allocated to the party least able to refuse them rather than the party best able 
to manag  2008, pp.708). This goes to show that unless 
risks are appropriately distributed among the respective entities, a PPP scheme can be 
                                                          




-for-money basis, what 
oosemore, 2007, pp. 
70).  
Another challenge associated with these types of arrangements is that government 
guarantees2 are not subject to the same degree of scrutiny by going through the budget 
process as regular spending guarantee legally binds a 
(Hemming, 2006, pp.30). Furthermore, most PPP projects are recorded off-balance sheet, 
allowing governments to delay payment and in the process secure private financing and 
 2007, pp.1). However, this 
can cause major problems as off-balance sheet financing enables governments to by-pass 
expenditure controls, which in effect can obscure government liabilities. In the case of 
Marques, 2010, pp.4027).  
The preceding discussion on risk allocation naturally leads one to ask how risks 
should be evaluated and how to account for uncertainty as well as risks in PPPs (Grimsey 
and Lewis, 2002, 2004, 2005). Uncertainty and risk are present whenever a project has 
more than one possible outcome. Whereas risk can be characterized by some calculable 
probability on a future event occurring and the corresponding effect it would have on 
expected outcomes should it materialize (Broadbent et al., 2008), in the case of 
uncertainty, the future outcome is unclear, hence actual probabilities cannot be assigned 
(qtd. in Demirag 2010; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). A likely consequence of uncertainty 
in these types of arrangements  long planning horizon, complex structures, information 
asymmetries  and especially in conventional procurement models is optimism bias 
through cost overruns. However, unlike in conventional procurement models, with PPPs 
optimism bias is minimized through the project cycle (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg 
B, 2004).  
A fundamental aspect of PPPs is balancing the interests of the public and private 
sectors. Due in part to different attitudes towards risk and responses to uncertainty, 
                                                          
2 A guarantee is a form of government intervention intended to reduce the financial costs of risks faced by 




differing views abound concerning the appropriate discounting method to use in these 
types of partnerships. Arrow and Lind (1970) argue that when calculating the present 
value of returns from a public investment a distinction must be made between private and 
 
3 rate of 3,5% is used 
as the real discount rate for PPPs; meanwhile in Australia the discount rate is based on 
the risk-free rate adjusted for risk through the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) (Sarmento, 2010).  
While some argue otherwise (Grout and Klein, 1997; Modigliani and Miller, 
1997), it is widely acknowledged that private sector borrowing costs are higher than the 
ing at a risk-free rate. A more 
unanimous consensus, however, is that projects have to earn at least the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) to be acceptable by investors. Hence, the discount rate allowing 
for the identification of a viable project is determined by its WACC (Brealey et al, 1997). 
At the same time, WACC alone does not reflect the required risk premium. Ye and Tiong 
(2000) show that a combination of the WACC and the dual risk-return methods can 
provide a better decision for risk evaluation of privately financed infrastructure projects.  
For the purpose of this study, four different discount rates are used in evaluating 
 (2003, 
C68) argument that the practice of using the same discount rate for conventional 
favors too much public sector provision,
used in this study is adjusted for risk through the addition of a risk margin (reflecting 
systematic risk), to a risk free rate.  
We now proceed to a brief description of the types of risks inherent in PPPs. A 
more detailed identification of risks specific to the SCUT concessions is provided in 
section 3 where a risk matrix is used as a way to qualitatively assess the projects in 
question.  
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2.2.1. Risk Identification  
As previously highlighted, there are two dimensions to risk allocation through 
VfM; qualitative and quantitative. Here, we focus on the qualitative dimension, i.e., the 
-by-step 
analysis of cost-
Lewis, 2004, pp.87). The ability of PPPs to allow for risk sharing between the parties 
involved in the contract is driven by VfM, which in essence reflects the risks and 
uncertainties in these types of arrangements. Risk identification is therefore one of the 
most critical stages in risk allocation. Hence, a process of due-diligence must be applied 
to assess the impact of relevant risks and the extent to which they are covered by the 
contractual agreement as well as to set alternative mitigation measures should the need 
arise. For instance, operating cost overruns may seriously hinder the creation of VfM. To 
manage this type of risk, a fixed-price contract can be considered. This type of contract 
would provide incentives for cost minimization in that the oper
relating to the fluctuations in operating costs and makes a profit only if the costs actually 
 
Qualitative assessment using a risk matrix helps identify which risks are shared, 
retained or transferred to the party best able to manage them (Yescombe, 2001). In 
chronological order, risks can be identified and categorized as follows (Gatti, 2008):  
(i) Pre-completion phase risks: activity planning, technological, construction 
risks; 
(ii) Post-completion phase risks: supply, operational, market risks; and,  
(iii) Risks common to pre-completion and post-completion phase: interest rate 











2.3. Benchmark of Shadow Toll Contracting 
Although not as widely adopted as actual tolls, shadow tolls are used in some 
parts of Europe as well as in Canada. The U.K. pioneered the concept and practice of 
shadow tolls dating back to the early 1990s through its implementation of the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), a strategic economic policy that delegated financing of public 
infrastructure projects to the private sector.4 Between 1993 and 1996, the U.K. instituted 
eight 30-year long shadow toll contracts which accounted for about 35% of all new 
construction projects between 1996 and 2001. It is estimated that payment for these eight 
contracts totals £220 million annually, translating into a total cost of approximately £6 
billion over the life of the contracts (Shaoul et al., 2006). It is important to stress, 
however, that the introduction of shadow tolls in the U.K. was seen as a transitory 
mechanism for moving to a system of real tolls some time in the future (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004, Shaoul et al., 2006).  
Besides the U.K., shadow tolls are also in use in Belgium, Canada, Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Spain. In the Netherlands, one case under a shadow toll scheme is the 
Noord tunnel, whose competitive tendering process was launched in 1991 (Bousquet and 
Fayard, 2001). In New Brunswick, Canada, the Fredericton-Moncton highway project has 
recently been converted to a shadow toll scheme (Taylor et al., 2001), and there are cases 
where a combination of real and shadow tolling is used, such as the Golden Ears Bridge 
in British Columbia (Buxbaum and Ortiz, 2009). In Spain, the M45-M501 8km long 
highway around Madrid has been upgraded through three separate shadow toll 
procurements and is currently at its pre-design stage (Report, 2009). 
Shadow toll concessions take the form of a DBFO scheme where the 
concessionaire designs, builds, finances and operates the road without necessarily owning 
the assets used to develop the project (Yescombe, 2002). Usage payments for shadow 
toll-based projects are made by the public entity and not the users, for whom the 
infrastructure is free. The public sector pays the concessionaire, at least in part, on the 
60). Under DBFOs, payments can also be made based on performance which is measured 
                                                          




in terms of road availability (e.g. number of lanes closed to traffic) and road safety 
conditions. In the event of higher than expected traffic, for instance, the concessionaire is 
overcompensated, in other words, paid in excess of what was planned but is subject to a 
capped revenue threshold (Bousquet and Fayard, 2001). Although there are cases in 
which shadow toll contracting are regarded as availability payments5, these two forms of 
payment slightly differ in their approach. While shadow tolls rely on traffic volumes, 
availability payments are based on other dimensions of service quality, including safety 
and minimum performance criteria.  
It is also worth emphasizing that shadow tolls are not a source of funding in and 
of itself but rather a tool that allows for the pooling of new sources of capital. Perhaps 
one of the key advantages of such a payment mechanism is that they are politically 
appealing and generate little, if any, resistance from users. There is no tendency for 
taxes associated with the road sector. In Finland, for example, a shadow toll system was 
adopted partly as a result of existing high motor spirit, road tax and customs duties. Also, 
the low level of road usage did not justify the use of real tolls, hence a shadow toll was 
considered a better and more feasible alternative. The second key advantage of shadow 
tolls is that there are no expenses associated with toll collection. Whereas under a toll 
system, additional costs related to the construction, maintenance, and operation of toll 
collection facilities can be rather significant. It is estimated that an average of about 10% 
to 15% of revenue is absorbed by toll collection costs (Bousquet and Fayard, 2001).  
Despite these advantages, as highlighted earlier, shadow tolls do not generate new 
sources of capital, a not-so-cost-effective option for the public or the private sector 
(depending on whether the maximum revenue is capped). Moreover, users are not subject 
to the real costs of using the road. Further criticism has also been rai
National Audit Office concerning the appropriateness of transferring volume risk or 
downside demand risk to the private sector as the latter is unable to influence demand 
using pricing measures (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). Overall, shadow toll contracting 
makes for a feasible payment mechanism for private finance either as an interim 
                                                          




financing mechanism preceding the application of real tolls or when the levying of tolls 
prevents or inhibits the use of the infrastructure.  
 
3. The SCUT Concessions: The Case of Portugal 
3.1. Background 
Following the launch of the National Road Program in 1996, the SCUT 
concessions were put into tender in 1998 as part of an initiative by the Portuguese 
government to improve the provision of public infrastructure in relatively poor regions. It 
consists of seven concessions, namely, Algarve, Beira Interior, Beiras Litoral & Alta, 
Costa de Prata, Interior Norte, Grande Porto, and Norte Litoral operating under a design, 
construct and operate scheme. These represent approximately 930 km of new highways, 
equivalent to 30% of national road concessions at the time. PPPs are project finance, and 
as such they are financed mainly through debt, usually 70%-90% (Esty, 2004). Under 
 
Portuguese), payments to the private consortium for road usage are made by the public 
entity rather than the users. Payments were based on traffic volume at a pre-established 
rate per vehicle. These were made annually to the private bidders (through tax payers  
money) using the following band structure (Sarmento, 2010):   
(i) Band A: a payment of x per vehicle per kilometer for the first (a*1000) 
vehicles per day (vpd)/km; 
(ii) Band B: a payment of y per vehicle per km for the next (b*1000) vpd/km; and 
(iii) Band C: All higher levels of vpd/vkm = no payment. 
Burdened by budget constraints and rising fiscal costs, in September of 2010 the 
Portuguese government announced its decision to discontinue the shadow toll system in 
favor of a real toll model. An estimate of the costs to the public sector associated with the 
concessions is presented in Exhibit 4. The renegotiation process for the introduction of 
real tolls is in progress and at its concluding phase. Phase one of the introduction of tolls 
came into effect in October of 2010, and encompassed the areas, Costa de Prata, Grande 
Porto and Norte Litoral. The second and last phase took place in December of the same 
year, covering the remaining four concessions. The new payment structure allows the 




over to the public sector, Estradas de Portugal, and is remunerated based on road 
availability.  
 











Source: Court of Audit Report 
 
The introduction of the SCUT concessions was, in many respects, conceived as a 
provisional arrangement. It was intended that once the regions covered under SCUT 
reached a GDP per capita equal or superior to 80% of the national level, a purchasing 
power equal or superior to 90% of the national indicator, and the alternative roads to 
SCUT achieved one third of the travel time permitted in the SCUT concessions, a move 
towards real tolling would ensue. Concomitant with the high financial costs incurred 
through the concessions, part of the controversy surrounding these concessions is also 
motivated by the fact that of the 930 km area covered under SCUT, only 55% falls under 
ot fully 
justify the motivation proclaimed by the government in the first place.  
In light of the above, did the SCUT concessions create VfM? Subsequently, how 




an assessment of the concessions starting with the qualitative dimension in the form of a 
risk matrix. 
 
3.2. Risk Matrix 
Table 1 provides the risk allocation for the SCUT concessions. As stated earlier, 
risk allocation is complex due to the confluence of factors impacting the project. A risk 
matrix helps identify which risks are retained by the public sector, which are transferred 
to the private sector, and which are shared. As can be seen in the matrix, some risks do 
not fall distinctly within the private or public sector and have to be shared between the 
two parties. Arguably, the allocation of availability risk in service level, for instance, 
would be better managed if transferred to the private entity as it is a measure of 
performance concerning the service provided. This way, incentives would be given to the 
private party to achieve cost minimization. On the other hand, risks due to changes in 
environmental standards or laws have all been allocated to the private sector although 
they would have been better mitigated if shared with the public sector as the latter is 
better able to influence environmental laws.  
Literature identifies the demand, construction, financial, and operating and 
maintenance (O&M) risks as the main risks that can be transferred to the private sector 
and the rest are merely residual (OECD, 2008). From this Table, we can see that 
construction (with the exception of unilateral changes and expropriation), O&M (with the 
exception of unilateral changes, accidents and latent defects which are shared) and 
financial risks were all transferred to the private sector. The demand risk, on the other 
hand, was shared until 2010 but later retained by the public sector upon renegotiations 
based on the new band structure outlined above. Allocating demand risk to the public 
sector reduces private sector risk, equally reducing incentives for private sector 
efficiency.  
Accordingly, therein lies the scope of this study and the motivation driving it. 
Assessing the values of these three main risks transferred to the private sector and 
comparing them against the government payments 





Table1. Allocation of Risks within the SCUT Concessions  
Source: Columns (i), (iii), (iv) and (vi): Direção-Geral do Tesouro e Finanças (2011). Columns 
(ii) and (v):  assessment based on Ball et. al. (2003) risk composition. 
 
Types of Risks (i) Description (ii) Designation (iii)  Phase (iv) Impact of Risk (v) Allocation (vi)
Design Project Private
Planning Project Public
Obtaining licenses and 
necessary approval 
Project Private
Disinterest on the part of 
the private tender
Bidding Public
Failure to meet deadlines 




Meeting deadlines Construction Medium Private
Additional costs (extra 
work)
Construction Medium Private
Unilateral changes Construction Low Public
Quality/reliability Construction Low Private
Expropriation 
(implementation and costs) Construction Low Private
Expropriation (on 
publication of the 
declaration of public utility)
Construction Low Public
Damage to infrastructure 
(own/third party/injury to 
workers)
Construction Medium Private
Toll collection Operation Medium Private
Additional costs (extra 
work)
Operation Medium Private
Accidents Operation Low Shared
Unilateral changes Operation Low Public
Changes to implemented 
technology
Operation Low Private
Failure to meet quality 
levels
Operation Medium Private
Latent defects Operation Low Shared
Inflation Construction/Operation 
Low Private
Interest rates Construction/Operation Medium Private








variation in the 




Disruption in supply Operation Private

































variation in relevant 
financial indicators, 
risk of default, etc. 
Environmental 
Unforeseen 







variation due to bad 













4. Methodology  
Based on the main risks identified, three input variables were used as a basis for 
our evaluation. These are: capital expenditure (capex), interest costs, and operating and 
maintenance (O&M) costs. It is essential that risks be considered on a project-by-project 
basis, hence the study assesses risks for each of the concessions. The data used was 
obtained from the Portuguese Public Road Institute (as shown in Table 2) and from the 
Court of Audit Report.  
 
Table 2. SCUT  Data 
Source: Court of Audit Report. WACC,  
  
4.1. Evaluation Methods 
 
First, the net present value (NPV) of government payments and those of the costs 
(capex, interest costs, O&M costs) were calculated. In calculating the NPVs, four 
different discount rates were applied, namely, 
 (i) the Portuguese risk free rate of 4,5% based on a 10-year yield on government 
bond (before 2008 financial crisis); 
( ii) the legal Portuguese discount rate, as of 2003, for PPPs of 6%;  
(iii) WACC-based discount rates incorporating both equity and debt financing; 
and 
(iv) CAPM-determined discount rates reflecting the level of systematic risk 
associated with each project.  
Second, a sensitivity analysis of the main input variables using the four discount 
rates was carried out to test the robustness of the results obtained from the NPV analysis.  
Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & Alta Norte Litoral TOTAL
Capex 438.000 499.000 243.000 298.000 584.000 753.000 228.000 3.043.000
Debt - % 90,60% 98,00% 83,10% 91,30% 80,00% 91,20% 76,00% 88,30%
Debt 396.828 489.020 201.933 272.074 467.200 686.736 173.280 2.687.071
Equity - % 9,40% 2,00% 16,90% 8,70% 20,00% 8,80% 24,00% 11,70%
Equity  41.172 9.980 41.067 25.926 116.800 66.264 54.720 355.929
Debt/Equtiy 10 49 5 10 4 10 3 8
Cost of Debt 8,83% 6,09% 6,30% 5,92% 5,70% 6,33% 7,38% 6,57%
Cost of Equity 13,00% 13,18% 7,72% 11,89% 12,20% 13,10% 6,41% 11,06%
Tax 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
WACC 7,22% 4,74% 5,23% 5,09% 5,86% 5,48% 5,75% 5,64%
IRR (before tax) 7,35% 9,59% 6,67% 8,43% 9,50% 9,24% 6,68% N/A
Bl 4,11 18,88 2,34 4,44 2,00 4,39 1,69 3,33




Third, we computed the NPV-at-risk for the base case NPV of payments and NPV 
of costs discounted at WACC. As shown by Ye and Tiong (2000), standard measures of 
risks and returns are limited in their scope and application of risk assessment and 
financing methods. NPV-at-risk on the other hand, combines a risk-adjusted discount rate 
method (WACC) and the dual-risk return method, capturing both the size of the 
acceptable deviation and the appropriate confidence levels in its assessment. Here, the 
WACC is the appropriate discount rate since it does not overestimate risks. 
Further, since the distribution functions of returns are not known, Monte Carlo simulation 
was conducted to generate the distribution of the possible NPVs assuming a normal 
distribution. Using Ye and Tiong paper as a guide, we calculated the NPV-at-
risk for each concession taking into account the NPVs of payments and of the three main 
costs. NPV-at-risk is then given by: NPV-at-risk = NPVµ - Z( )*           
Where Z( )  is the number of units of standard deviation corresponding to  
  is the confidence level  
  is the standard deviation  
Lastly, a comparison between NPV-at-risk with NPV of payments and NPV-at-
risk with NPV of costs allowed us to measure the value of risk for each project and 
estimate the gains in each project, respectively. 
 
4.2. Basic Assumptions 
The assumptions made in our analyses are as highlighted on Table 3. In addition, 
the literature considers the level of transferred risk on transport to be low or medium low 
(Sarmento, 2010). An unlevered beta of 0,5 based on Damadoran (2012) is used in our 
analysis. Accordingly, the risk-adjusted rates based on the CAPM were determined using 
each of l = u [1 + D/E (1  t)]; where D/E 
stands for the debt-to-equity ratio, and t, the tax rate. The CAPM for a single project is 
calculated using the following formula: 
CAPM : Ri = Rf + l (Rm f )  
Where R  is the required return on the project 
Rf  is the risk free rate (4,5%) 




Rm  is the expected return  
 
Table 3.  
 
 
5. Results  
Table 4 indicates the NPV payments using the four discount rates. As can be seen, 
NPV payments are quite sensitive to the discount rate. For instance, the 0,36% 
differential between the 6% and WACC rates amounts to a differential of approximately 
300 million in total NPV payments.  
 
Table 4. Discounted NPV Payments (Euro million) 
 
Source: Authors.  
 
To reflect the uncertainty inherent in the projects, sensitivity analyses in NPV 
terms were performed for each of the concessions: using downside and upside 
assumptions regarding the capex, interest costs and O&M costs (applying the four 
discount rates). The results of the sensitivity analyses are set out in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 
(see appendix). Here, we also see that the discount rates have a profound impact on the 
NPV of costs and that the NPV of costs show significant downside and upside variations. 
Moreover, these results illustrate why the determination of the appropriate discount rate 
for evaluating these types of projects (especially as it concerns the appraisal stage) is one 
of the most critical, and the most debated in the literature. 
Variable Assumption
  Capex (Table 2): 5 years (constant)
 Major repairs every 10 years = 10% Capex + 3% annual inflation
Debt (Table 2): Maturity = 20 years (principal repayment on a constant annual basis)
  Interest rate = Cost of Debt (Table 2)
Real data until 2010 based on Company Financial Report 




Discount Rates Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & 
Alta
Norte Litoral Total 
NPV at Rf 4.5% 1.708.733 1.278.366 661.475 920.370 915.064 1.824.554 800.282 8.108.845
NPV at WACC 1.307.958 1.242.567 601.108 860.564 762.022 1.610.192 666.497 7.061.600
NPV at 6% 1.469.447 1.074.629 545.349 778.311 748.221 1.509.669 643.314 6.768.941




In determining the NPV-at-  
simulation (with 1000 iterations) was run based on the base case distributions (mean and 
standard deviation) for each of the main risks identified (capex, interest, O&M) as well as 
the risks associated with government payments. The reason we consider payment risk is 
because it represents country risk. With a 95% confidence level, the results of the 
assessment are shown in Table 9. The NPV-at-risk Total Costs  captures the three main 
risks allocated to the private sector. In absolute value, concessions Beiras Litoral & Alta, 
Beira Interior, and Interior Norte (in descending order) are the most expensive to the 
state. Capex and payment risks are the most important.  
 
Table 9. NPV-at-Risk Assessment (discounted at WACC) 
 
Source: Authors.  
 
Further, as shown in Table 10, on average, 11% of payments (including payment 
risk) went to cover risks of which capital expenditure is the highest at 6%. O&M risks on 
the other hand, are almost negligible. Grande Porto and Beiras Litoral & Alta indicate the 
highest share of risk as percentage of payments both with and without payment risk (see 
also Exhibit 5).  
 
Table 10. Weight of Risks as Percentage of NPV Payments 
 
 Source: Authors.  
 
 
Indicators Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & Alta Norte Litoral TOTAL
NPV-at-risk Payments 54.273 35.544 20.632 20.024 31.664 65.206 19.815 247.158
NPV-at-risk Capex 58.794 76.849 36.304 45.157 83.745 111.502 33.022 445.373
NPV-at-risk Interest Costs 13.419 7.855 5.145 6.444 9.848 16.690 5.050 64.451
NPV-at-risk O&M Costs 31 26 20 34 41 13 27 192
NPV-at-risk Total Costs 126.516 120.274 62.102 71.659 125.299 193.411 57.914 757.175
NPV-at-risk Total Costs 
(excluding payment risk)
72.244 84.730 41.469 51.635 93.634 128.205 38.099 510.016
NPV Payments 1.307.958 1.242.567 601.108 860.564 762.022 1.610.192 666.497 7.050.908
Indicators Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & Alta Norte Litoral Average
NPV-at-risk Payments 4% 3% 3% 2% 4% 4% 3% 4%
NPV-at-risk Capex 4% 6% 6% 5% 11% 7% 5% 6%
NPV-at-risk Interest Costs 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
NPV-at-risk O&M Costs 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
NPV-at-risk Total Costs 10% 10% 10% 8% 16% 12% 9% 11%
NPV-at-risk Total Costs 




Exhibit 5. Weight of Risks as Percentage of NPV Payments 
Source: Authors.  
 
Exhibit 6 shows the difference between what the government is paying and how 
much it is getting in terms of risks, with the greatest NPV payment and total risk 
differential registered by Beiras Litoral & Alta and the smallest differential by Algarve.   
 
Exhibit 6. NPV-Payment and Total Risk Differential (excluding payment risk) 











































The main results of our analyses regarding NPV-at-risk are shown in Table 11. 
Here, total risks also include payment risks. As can be seen in the last column of the 
Table, with the exception of Grande Porto, all the SCUT concessions show gains after-
transfer risks (before taxes), indicating that the costs incurred by the public sector through 
the contract payments, far outweigh those assumed by the private sector.  
 
Table 11. Gains Before & After-Risk Transfer (before taxes) 
Source: Authors.  
 
Finally, Table 12 reports the gains to the private sector as percentage of the NPV 
of payments before and after risk transfer. In descending order, Norte Litoral, Costa de 
Prata, and Beira Interior register the highest gains before and after risk transfer. Further, 
Grande Porto and Beiras Litoral & Alta provide for an interesting analysis. Among the 
concessions, they are the two that took on the most risk as percentage a of NPV payments 
(both when assessed with and without payment risk); this is also shown by the fact that 
both register above average share of risk (refer to Table 10). Correspondingly, they are 
the two concessions that report the smallest gains (or loss in the case of Grande Porto) as 









Concessions NPV Payment NPV CAPEX NPV Interest Costs NPV O&M Costs NPV Total Costs Gains before Risk Transfer NPV-at-risk Total Risk Gains after Risk Transfer
Beira Interior 1.307.958 358.515 224.279 1.220 584.013 723.945 126.516 597.429
Interior Norte 1.242.567 438.172 220.645 854 659.671 582.896 120.274 462.622
Algarve 601.108 210.666 91.226 779 302.672 298.436 62.102 236.334
Costa de Prata 860.564 259.846 116.117 1.861 377.824 482.740 71.659 411.081
Grande Porto 762.022 499.961 181.350 1.770 683.081 78.941 125.299 -46.357
Beiras Litoral & Alta 1.610.192 646.895 306.341 1.154 954.390 655.803 193.411 462.392
Norte Litoral 666.497 194.913 89.452 837 285.201 381.295 57.914 323.381




Table 12. Weight of Gains before and after Risk Transfer 
 
Source: Authors.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The objective of this study was threefold: first, it examined the allocation of risks 
between the public and private sectors in the seven SCUT concessions, namely, Algarve, 
Beira Interior, Beiras Litoral & Alta, Costa de Prata, Interior Norte, Grande Porto, and 
Norte Litoral. We concluded that for the most part, with the exception of demand risk, 
risks under the SCUT concessions were well allocated between the two parties.  
Then this paper identified the main risks transferred to the private sector and how 
to best evaluate them. Through a risk matrix we identified these risks to be the 
construction, financial and O&M risks. We used a valuation technique developed by Ye 
and Tiong (2000), NPV-at-risk, which incorporates both the WACC and the dual-risk 
return methods, thereby capturing both the size of the acceptable deviation and the 
appropriate confidence levels in our variables of interest.  
Last, this study evaluated the main risks transferred to the private sector and 
money to measure the gains, if any, for the private sector before and after risk transfer. 
We find that the risks transferred to the private sector represent a very small share of 
what the public sector is paying. On average, risk transferred to the private sector 
represents 11% of NPV payments which is in fact slightly higher but close to that of the 
Australian benchmark. The Australian benchmark of transferrable risks (based on other 
sector projects) is set at 8% (OECD, 2008). We also find that the costs to the public 
Concessions
Gains before 
Risk Transfer (% 
NPV Payment)
Gains after Risk 
Transfer (% 
NPV Payment)
Norte Litoral 57% 49%
Costa de Prata 56% 48%
Beira Interior 55% 46%
Algarve 50% 39%
Interior Norte 47% 37%
Beiras Litoral & 
Alta 41% 29%





sector, through the payment obligations, far outweigh the costs taken in by the private 
sector. More specifically, with the exception of Grande Porto, all the concessions register 
after risk transfer gains (before taxes). On average, the concessions register before and 
after risk transfer gains (as percentage of NPV payments) of 45% and 35% respectively.  
Limitations in this study are that the risk analyses and the subsequent valuation 
methods employed are limited to the projects in question and would not necessarily lead 
to the same conclusion in other projects. Other valuation methods may very well lead to 
different results. Another limitation is that this valuation exercise, as any other, is subject 
to the assumptions and expectations set by the authors, rendering it subjective.  
Was risk crucial to achieving VfM? When looking at the high gains, doubts arise 
as to whether VfM was achieved. On the other hand, no conclusion can be drawn seeing 
as no alternative approach was analyzed. However, in a broader context and more in line 
with the existing literature on SCUT, when compared against the use of a PSC, Sarmento 
(2010) finds that procuring the projects through the PPP approach was far more 
expensive and did not add VfM to the public sector. Arguably, a substantial part of the 
inefficiency suggested from our analyses can be traced back to the appraisal process 
itself. The lack of public sector comparators in assessing the projects meant that cost 
estimates from bidders were not properly assessed and thus there was no way of assessing 
whether the PPP approach offered a superior outcome. Similarly, the absence of a legal 
and institutional framework for PPPs coupled with the significant number of PPP deals 
undertaken within a short time frame undermined, to a great degree, the performance and 
execution of the projects in question. The SCUT case strongly suggests the need for a 
more coherent and rigorous appraisal of infrastructure projects in Portugal.   
The current study can be expanded by conducting more detailed analysis on risks. 
Similarly, a more comprehensive risk valuation exercise can be performed using other 
valuation methods. In addition, an interesting analysis can be had by comparing these 
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Exhibit 1.  Net Payments of Public-Private Partnerships 2008-2010 (Euro million)  
 




























Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis at 4.5% 
 
Variation Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & Alta Norte Litoral
50% 991.681 999.956 468.298 581.369 1.083.719 1.492.980 451.514
20% 793.345 799.965 374.638 465.095 866.975 1.194.384 361.212
15% 760.289 766.633 359.028 445.716 830.851 1.144.618 346.161
10% 727.233 733.301 343.418 426.337 794.727 1.094.852 331.111
Base case NPV 661.121 666.638 312.199 387.579 722.479 995.320 301.010
-10% 595.009 599.974 280.979 348.821 650.232 895.788 270.909
-15% 561.953 566.642 265.369 329.442 614.108 846.022 255.858
-20% 528.897 533.310 249.759 310.063 577.984 796.256 240.808
-50% 330.560 333.319 156.099 193.790 361.240 497.660 150.505















Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis at WACC 
 
Variation Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & Alta Norte Litoral
50% 876.020 989.506 454.008 566.736 1.024.622 1.431.584 427.802
20% 700.816 791.605 363.206 453.389 819.697 1.145.268 342.241
15% 671.615 758.622 348.073 434.498 785.543 1.097.548 327.981
10% 642.415 725.638 332.939 415.607 751.389 1.049.829 313.721
Base case NPV 584.013 659.671 302.672 377.824 683.081 954.390 285.201
-10% 525.612 593.704 272.405 340.042 614.773 858.951 256.681
-15% 496.411 560.720 257.271 321.151 580.619 811.231 242.421
-20% 467.211 527.737 242.137 302.259 546.465 763.512 228.161
-50% 292.007 329.835 151.336 188.912 341.541 477.195 142.601
Source: Authors.  
 
 
Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis at 6% 
 
Variation Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & Alta Norte Litoral
50% 924.603 937.883 439.818 545.518 1.018.896 1.400.919 423.344
20% 739.683 750.306 351.854 436.414 815.117 1.120.736 338.675
15% 708.863 719.043 337.193 418.231 781.154 1.074.038 324.564
10% 678.042 687.781 322.533 400.047 747.190 1.027.341 310.453
Base case NPV 616.402 625.255 293.212 363.679 679.264 933.946 282.230
-10% 554.762 562.730 263.891 327.311 611.338 840.552 254.007
-15% 523.942 531.467 249.230 309.127 577.374 793.854 239.895
-20% 493.122 500.204 234.569 290.943 543.411 747.157 225.784
-50% 308.201 312.628 146.606 181.839 339.632 466.973 141.115
Source: Authors.  
 
 
Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis at CAPM 
 
Variation Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & Alta Norte Litoral
50% 460.425 152.363 298.645 274.909 736.281 707.237 318.592
20% 368.340 121.891 238.916 219.927 589.024 565.789 254.874
15% 352.993 116.812 228.961 210.763 564.482 542.215 244.254
10% 337.645 111.733 219.006 201.600 539.939 518.640 233.634
Base case NPV 306.950 101.575 199.097 183.272 490.854 471.491 212.395
-10% 276.255 91.418 179.187 164.945 441.768 424.342 191.155
-15% 260.908 86.339 169.232 155.782 417.226 400.767 180.535
-20% 245.560 81.260 159.277 146.618 392.683 377.193 169.916
-50% 153.475 50.788 99.548 91.636 245.427 235.746 106.197






























Beira Interior Interior Norte Algarve Costa de Prata Grande Porto Beiras Litoral & 
Alta
Norte Litoral
O&M Risk
Interest Cost Risk
Capex Risk
Payments Risk
NPV Payments
